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NOTES.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES WHEN NEITHER PARTY IS A RESIDENT
OF THE STATE IN WHICH SUIT IS BROUGHT.-Since the Constitu-

tion granted to plaintiffs the right to bring suits in the Federal
Courts when there was diversity of citizenship between the parties
to the action,' it would seem reasonable that when such suits were
brought in a State Court the defendant should have the right to
remove the case into a Federal Court. But this right was not
granted by the Constitution, nor, except in a very restricted manner,
'Art.

1II, Sec. 2.
(242)

NOTES

by the Judiciary Act of 1780." By that Act a defendant was permitted to remove causes only when he was a non-resident of the
state in which the resident plaintiff brought suit. Thus the defendant was given no right of removal in cases where neither party was
a resident of the state in which suit was brought. The Act of
March 3, 1875. removed this inequality and allowed the defendant
to remove. any suit involving a controversy between citizens in
different states where the anount involved exceeded five hundred
dollars3 But as the Federal Courts became congested, Congress.
by the Act of iMS. again restricted the right of removal, while leaving untouched, except as to the amount involved, the right of plaintiffs to initiate a suit in the Federal Courts. This Act,4 which has
bemii re-enacted in the Judicial Code,' is still in force. It gives the
defendant the right to remove the cause on the ground of diversity
of citizenship only when he is not a resident of the state where
suit is brought.
One feature of the present Act long threatened to restrict, and
in many cases actually did restrict, still further the right of the
defendant to remove the cause. The Act allows the removal of
only those cases of which it gives the District Courts original jurisdiction, and requires them to be removed into the District Court for
the proper district," which is defined by the next section of the Act
as the district in which the suit is pending.' Before the Supreme
Court first construed these provisions, the lower Federal Courts
differed somewhat on their interpretation. One Federal Court held
that it had original jurisdiction under Section i of the Act ' on the
basis of diversity of citizenship only when the plaintiff was a resident of the state in which suit was brought and the defendant was
not,' although it stated that the provisions of this section might be
a i Stat. 73, Sec. 12.
*Act of March 3, 7875, c. 137. sec. 2, 18 Stat. 470.
"Act of August 13, 1888, C.866, sec. 2, 25 Stat. 433,

sec. 12, re-enacted withsubstantial change in the Judicial Code (Act of Mar. 3, 191, c. 231, sec. 28,
36 Stat. io94). which is the present Act governing the removal of causes on the
ground of diversity of citizenship. The only change made by the Act of 19.!
in the earlier Act in this regard was that such causes should be removed to
the District Court for the proper district, instead of the Cir'cuit Court as
I)rovided in the Act of 1888.
' See Note 4, supra.
'Act of Mar. 3, 1911, C. 231, sec. 28, 36 Stat. io94.
'Id.. sec. 29, which was substantially a re-enactment of the Act of Aug.
13, 1888, amending the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, sec. 3.

out

"Act of Aug. 13, i888, c. 866, sec. i. re-enacted in the Act of Mar. 3

c. 231, sec. 51:"-. . - where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be
brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
'Foulk v- Gray, 12o Fed. i56 (C. C. igoa).
1g1,
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waived by mutual consent of the parties. But the great majority of the
courts held otherwise, and allowed the removal irrespective of the
plaintilf's residence, provided that the defendant was not a resident
of the stzite in which suit was brought."' Due to the fact that when
the District (or Circuit) Court remanded a case to the State Court
the statute precluded any appeal from this decision," no case under
these provisions of the Act of 1888 came before the Supreme Court
of the United States until 19o6. Then, in the case of Ex partc
II'isncr,"2 the Supreme Court declared that the provision in Section
1 11 as to venue of suits in diversity of citizenship cases was mandatory and, construing Section 2 with reference to this section, held
that a non-resident defendant could not remove the suit unless the
plaintiff resided in the state in which action was brought. Chief
Justice Fuller, who delivered the opinion, justified this holding on
the ground that the intention of Congress in passing the Act of i888
was to relieve the overburdened Federal Courts, and therefore that
in all cases in which a doubt appeared in the statute as to the right
to remove a cause, the removal should not be allowed, out of regard
for the intent of Congress in this Act to restrict, rather than enlarge, the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. As a result it was
held, under Section 3 of the Act, "that the Circuit Court for the
proper district is evidently the Circuit Court of the district of the
residence of the plaintiff [as] it is settled that no suit is removable
under Section 2 unless it be one that the plaintiff could have brought
originally in the Circuit Court." 13 This decision was considerably
modified, within little more than a year, by an almost identical court,
over Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, in the case of In re Moore."8
This case held that, under circumstances similar to those in the
Visner case, the suit was removable by the defendant if the plaintiff
assented. The court declared that the provision as to venue in Section i '1 was not mandatory, but might be waived by mutual consent
Kansas City Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co., 37 Fed. 3 (C. C. 1888) ; First
Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Bank. 37 Fed. 657 (C. C. 1888) (real defendant in

equity suit having an interest was non-resident, although nominal defendant
was not) ; Amsinck v. Balderston, 41 Fed. 641 (C. C. i&&)): Uhle v. Burnham, 42 Fcd. I (C. C. 189); Long v. Long, 73 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 1896);
Duncan v. Associated Press. 8i Fed. 417 (C. C. 1&97); Rome Petroleum Co. v.
lughes Co., 13o Fed. 585 (C. C. i9o4).
" Act of Aug. 13, I888, c. 866, sec. 2, re-enacted in Act of Mar. 3,1911, c.
231, sec. 28

-03 U. S. 449 (9o6).

" See Note 8, supra.
191T, c. 231, sec. 29, providing that in
1" Re-enacted in the Act of Iar. 3,
all cases where removal is permitted, the removal must be into the District
Court for the district in which the suit is pending.
" Supra in Note 12, at p. 457.
-'-09
U. S. 490 (1908).

See Note 8, supra.

NOTES
of the parties, thus recognizing the fundamental distinction between
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in general, and venue provisions
applying to any particular court. It is here that the crux of the
matter lies. Chief Justice Fuller recognized no distinction between
these two sets of provisions in his decision in Ex pare Visner " or
in his dissenting opinion in In re Moore.'" But from the very beginning the Supreme Court has distinguished venue provisions governing a particular District or Circuit Court from provisions relating to the general jurisdiction of the Federal District or Circuit
Courts, and has held that, while the latter are mandatory and
consent of the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Federal
Courts in general, yet the vetre provisions
constitute a personal
20
privilege which the parties may waive.
Later the decision in Ex pare Wisner was explained by the
Supreme Court as applicable only to cases of which the Federal
District Courts bad no original general jurisdiction, and not to the
venue provisions.2 1 if it held no more than this the [Visncr case
would be unquestioned, but the majority of the Federal Courts
followed its decision, as modified by In re Moore, as to venue, and
refused removal, when neither party was a resident of the state in
which suit was brought, without mutual consent, either express or
implied by the acts of the parties.22 One of the Federal Courts,
however, while paying verbal homage to the decision as to venue
in the Moore case, yet held that when the plaintiff brought suit in
the State Court of a state in which neither he nor the defendant resided, he waived the venue provision, and that, therefore, the defendant might remove the case to the District Court for the district
in which the suit was pending.23 Other Federal Courts went further 2 4 and held, directly contra to the Wisner case, that when suit is
"1See Note 15, supra.
"'Supra in Note 16 at p. 5r2.
'Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheaton 699 (U. S. 1823). The cases following

this, down to i9o8, are reviewed and discussed in In re Moore, 2o9 U. S. 490,
SlI'=In re Wint, 213 U. S. 458 (igog). This case, however,
did not disapprove of ln re Moore on the venue provisions.
" Shawnee Bank v. Missouri Ry. Co., 175 Fed. 456 (C. C. i99) ; Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Painter, 22o Fed. g8 (D. C. 1915); Keating v.Pennsylvania Co., 245 Fed. 155 (D. C. 1917); Kansas Gas Co. v. Wichita Gas Co.,
266 Fed. 614 (D. C. ig2o).

'Decker v. Southern Ry. Co., 189 Fed. 224 (C. C. i9ri).
few Federal Courts reached the result from these provisions and de-

"A

cisions that a suit brought in a state in which neither party resided could
be removed to the District Court of the district (in another state) in which
the plaintiff resided. Mattison v. B. & M. R. R., 2o5 Fed. 821 (D. C. 1913)
(dictum) ; Stewart v. Lumber Co., 211 Fed. 343 (D.C. 1914) ; Park Square
Co. v. American Locomotive CO.. 222 Fed. 979 (D. C. i9iS). This view,
however, was soon disapproved. New York Coal Co. v. Sunday Creek Co.,
230 Fed. 295 (D. C. 1916); Matazarro, v.Hustis, 256 Fed. 882 (D. C. 1919)
(dictum). See Rose, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (2d ed., 1922), 324.
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brought in a state of which the defendant is a non-resident, his
right to remove is absolute, irrespective of the plaintiff's consent.2
These decisions are based apparently on no other authority than the
plain language of the Judicial Code, under which, as was stated,
"tile plaintiff has the right [of election] in the first instance. When
[he] has exercised his election to sue in the court of a state in which
the defendant is a non-resident . . . such defendant is given
the right, under Section 28, to remove such
suit to the District Court
27
of the United States for such district."
Due to the denial of an appeal from an order to remand a case
to the State Court, " and the fact that the great majority of these
cases remanded the suit when the plaintiff refused to assent to its
removal, the question, as to the right of removal in this class of
cases over the plaintiff's objection did not reach the Supreme Court
after the Wisner case until the recent case of Lee v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Co."9 This case expressly overruled the Wisner case.
and modified the Moore case, holding that the venue provision of
Section 51 30 is a personal privilege of the defendant which he may
waive, and that the consent of the plaintiff to removal, therefore, is
not necessary. The defendant is held to have an absolute right of
removal where there is diversity of citizenship of the parties " when
suit is brought in a state of which he is a non-resident. The phrase
"original jurisdiction" in Section 28 was defined by the court to
mean original general jurisdiction, and to have no reference to venue
provisions as to cases brought originally in any particular District
Court.
There is little question that this interpretation is the correct one.
The Wisner case and those Federal cases following it have confused
general jurisdiction with venue, and cannot be supported on reason.
It is true that the intent of Congress in passing the Act of 1888 was
to lighten the burden on Federal Courts by restricting their jurisdiction, but as Mr. Justice Van Deventer stated in his opinion,12 the

" Baker v. Pinkham, 211 Fed. 728 (D.C. 1914); Hohenberg & Co. v.
Mobile Liners. Inc., 243 Fed. 169 (D. C. 1917); James v. Amarillo Co., 251
Fed. 337 (D. C. 1918).
*See James v. Amarillo Co., supra in Note 25, at p. 339.
Id., p. 342.
"See Note i , supra.

" Supreme Court of the United States, No. 422, October Term, 1922 (decided Jan. 22, T923). U. S. Adv. Ops. 256 (1922-23).

" See Note 8, supra.
The plaintiff may sometimes defeat the defendant's right of removal by
joining another party as defendant, but the defendant may overcome this in
certain cases by showing that the joinder is fraudulent or that the controversies are separable. See Rose, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, sees.
356-362, secs. 385-386. See, also, 6o CFNT. L J. 303 (9o6).
' Lee v. C. & 0. Rwy. Co., supra in Note 29, at p. 259.

NOTES

Act clearly restricted the removal of causes in other ways,"3 and it
does not seem to nullify the intention of Congress to hold that it
does not restrict removal in this respect. If a change in this particular respect is desired, it must be effected hy another Act.
As a matter of fact, it seems unlikely that it was the intention
of Congress so to restrict the defendant's right of removal. As
shown above, Congress did restrict the right of removal in other
ways, and there is no reason to suppose an intention to carry these
restrictions so far as to place the defendant at a distinct disadvantage
in this matter. When there is diversity of citizenship of the parties,
the plaintiff always may bring his suit in the Federal Court, Section
51 of the Judicial Code restricting him only as to the particular
District Court in which he is to bring it, tyi:., that of the district in
which either he, himself, or the defendant, resides. There is no
reason why the defendant should not have a like privilege, and be
able to remove every case involving diversity of citizenship. From
the statute it seems that he clearly has such right when he is a nonresident of the state where suit is brought, Section 28 restricting
him only as to the particular District Court into which he shall
remove it, vi:., that of the district in which the suit is pending. It
would be decidedly unjust to deprive a non-resident defendant of
this privilege as it would put him on a footing much inferior to
the plaintiff in this regard. From the words of the statute 3it does not
seem necessary to impute to Congress such an intention.
G.F.F.
"Act

of 1875 permitted either party to remove in any case involving

diversity of citizenship where the amount in controversy exceeded $50o. The
defendant was not even required to be a non-resident of the State in which
suit was brought, provided the plaintiff was.
Interesting in this connection are the cases removable because of a Federal question or Federal law involved. These cases are governed by the
same rules as those governing diversity of citizenship cases, except that by

Sec. 51 of the Act of 1911 (Sec. x of the Act of j888) they are to be
brought originally only in the District Court of the district in which the de-

fendant resides. On the question of the removal of such cases when the defendant was sued in a state in which he did not reside, most of the Federal
Courts felt themselves bound by the decisions in the Wisner and Moore
cases (Notes 12 and 16 supra) and refused to allow the removal. Bottoms v. St.
Louis & S. F. Ry., 179 Fed. 318 (C. C. igio); Boise Commercial Club v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 26o Fed. 769, 171 C. C. A. 495 (1919); although
there was some dissent from this view. Rubber Co. v. Whiting-Adams Co,
21o Fed. 393 (D. C. 1913).

In November, 1922, the case came before the

United States Supreme Court in the case of General Investment Co. v. Lake
Shore and M. S. Ry., U. S. Adv. Ops. 107 (1922-23). The Supreme Court
there allowed the removal, denying the application of the Wisner case, and
holding that the venue provision of Sec. 5x was a personal privilege of the
defendant, which he might waive and did waive by petitioning the District
Court of the district where suit was brought for removal.
When an alien is a party either plaintiff or defendant, the defendant may
remove the cause, irrespective of the state in which suit is brought. Sherwood
v. Newport News Co., 55 Fed. i (C. C. 1893) ; Bradshaw v. Bowen, 226 Fed.
323 (D. C. 1914).
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RECOVERY FOR THE AGGRAV.ATIGN

INJURED PERSON's LAWFUL

OF AN INJURY THROUGH TILE

AcM.-In the recent Pennsylvania case

of McCoy v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., the plaintiff sought workman's compensation for the death of her husband. The deceased,
in the employment of the defendant, fell from the roof of one of
its buildings, and suffered severe injuries; while in the hospital, he
contracted diphtheria, and died from its effects. In denying recovery for the death of the deceased, as not the result of an injury received in the course of his employment, the court based its decision
on the ground that the connection between the injury and the death
was not clearly enough established; that it had not been shown that
the deceased's "vital resistance was so lowered [by the injuries received] that he could not resist the infection by diphtheria bacilli";
and that, to establish such a connection sufficiently, the medical experts "must . . . testify at least that . . . it is their professional opinion the result in question most probably came from
the cause alleged." Where it is shown that the defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of an injury to the plaintiff, and that, as a
proximate result of the plaintiff's lowered vitality, he succumbed to
later attacks of an infectious disease, the weight of authority,2 in
accord with this view, logically allows the plaintiff to recover both
for the original injury and for its aggravated result.
A closely analogous group of cases deals with recovery for injuries aggravated through a mistake in medical treatment. Wk'here
the plaintiff is injured through the defendant's negligence, and employs a doctor, reasonably regarded as competent, to treat those injuries, but the doctor makes a mistake in treatment and the plaintiff's injuries are increased, the courts seem to be unanimous in allowing recovery for all the injury suffered 3
Is there any logical distinction in principle between these cases
and those in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for an injury ag'Supreme Court, No. 40, Oct. Term. 1922 (not yet reported).
2 Beauchamp v. Saginaw Co., 50 Mich. 163, i5 N. W. 65 (1883) ; T. H. &
I. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Id.

346 (I884); Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Hecht, ti5 Ind.

443, 17 N. E. 297 ('888); Bagley v. Mason, 69 Vt. r75, 37 Atl. 287 (1896);
McGarrahan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 171 Mass. 217, 5o N. E. 6i5 (i898);
Luisi v. Chicago, etc., Rwy. Co., 155 Iowa 458, 136 N. W. 322 (1912); Gray
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 153 Wis. 637, 142 N. XV. 505 (1913); Thomas v. St.
Louis, etc., Rwy. Co., 187 Mo. App. 420, 173 S. W. 728 (i9i5); Kelly v. Xatson Coal Co., 272 Pa. 39. 115 Atl. 885 (1922). Contra: Weber v. Third Avenue Rwy. Co., 12 App. Div. 512, 42 N. Y. S. 789 (i896).
'Lyons v. Erie Rwy. Co., 57 N. Y. 489 (1874) ; Chicago City Rwy. Co. v.
Cooney, 196 Ill. 466. 63 X. E. io29 (19o2); Pyke v. City of Jamestown. i5 N.
D. 157, to1 N. XV. 359 (i9o6) ; Wallace v. Penna. R. R., 222 Pa. s56, 71 At.
io,6 (i9o9); Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co., 212 Mass. 99, 98 N. E. 786 (1912):
Boa v. Terminal Rwys., 182 Cal. 93, 187 Pac. 2 (I92O); Yarrough v. Hines,
T2 Wash. 3to, 192 Pac. 886 (1920) ; McIntosh v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., iog
Kan. 246, 198 Pac. 1084 (1921) ; Smith v. Kansas City Rwys. Co., -208 Mo.
App. 139, 232 S. W. 261 (192i).

NOTES

gravated by his own act? Of course, where the additional damage
is caused by the plaintiff's negligence, no recovery is allowed.4 But
where, as in a recent New York case,5 the plaintiff, recuperating
from the fracture of his leg, which the defendant's negligence produced, stumbled, though exercising all due care, and again broke
the injured leg, recovery for both injuries was allowed. The trial
court charged, interalia: "If a person is injured, .
. and proceeds in accordance with the doctor's instructions and . . . in
a reasonably careful manner in getting about, and another accident
happens to him which results in aggravating his injury, without
negligence on his part, then the added injury may be added to the
original injury, and the damages may be compensation for all the
injury. . . . The defendant in any event is only liable for the
injuries naturally resulting from the accident." On appeal this
charge was held substantially to state the correct rule. The weight
of authority is in accord with this case, but a certain number of decisions seem to be directly contra.
In two Pennsylvania cases,7 the Supreme Court has held that the
jury should not be allowed to consider the aggravation of the injury
in computing the amount of damages, on the ground that the second
injury was too remote. In two earlier cases, in Massachusetts,s a
'Zibbell Y. City of Grand Rapids, xz9 Mich. 65., 89 N. W. 563 (Igoz);
Taxicab Co. v. Emanuel, 125 Md. 246, 93 Atl. 807 (1915).
a Wagner v. Mittendorf, 232 N. Y. 481, 134 N. E. 539, j78 N. Y. S. 925
(1922).

'Weiting v. Millston, 77 Wis. 523, 46 N. W. 879 (i8oo); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Hulsey. 32 Ala. 444, 31 So. 527 (i9oi) ; Conner v. Nevada,
188 Mo. 148, 86 S. V. 256 (go5); Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682,
96 Pac. 423 (9o8); Smith v. Northern Pacific Rwy. Co., 79 Wash. 448, 140
Pac. 685 (i914); Kelly v. Brewing Co., 86 N. J. L. 471, 92 Atl. 282 (1914) ;
]-Iartnett v. Tripp. 231 Mass. 382, 121 N. E. 17 (igi8); Stahl v. Southern
AMich. Rwy. Co., 211 Mich. 350, 178 N. W. 710 (192o); Matter of Phillips v.

Holmes Express Co, 229 N. Y. 527 (1920).
T
Wineberg v. DuBois Borough, 209 Pa. 430, 58 At. 8o7 (i9o4); Gail v.
Philadelphia. 273 Pa. 275, 117 Atl. 69 (1922). In the latter case, the second
injury, the facts of which are not given in the report, was that the plaintiff's
knee. injured by the defendant's negligence, gave way, and she fell down stairs,

breaking her other knee; she was, at the time, exercising due care, and, although the second injury occurred three years after the first, there was evidence of the continued weakness and necessity for treatment of the knee which

was first injured.
' Raymond v. Haverhill, 168 Mass. 382, 47 N. E. ior (1897); Snow v.
New York, etc., R. Co,,85 .Mass. 321, 70 N. E. 205 (9o.4).
The first case
above appears to be distinguishable because a town was there defendant and a
statute made towns liable only for direct and immediate injuries resulting
from their negligent failure to repair the streets.
The case of Vander Velde v. Leroy, 140 Mich. 359, 103 N. W. 812 (1)o5),
agreeing with the decisions in the above cases, was questioned in Stahl v. Rwy.
Co., supra in Note 6. and appears to be no longer the law.
See, also, East Tennessee Telephone Co. v. Jeffries, 153 Ky. 133, T54 S. W.
I 12 (1913).
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similar conclusion was reached, but a recent decision in that jurisdiction I seems to be in accord with the weight of authority.
Arguing from the general principles of tort liability, the position
adopted in these minority cases seems entirely untenable. "The existence of negligence is to be judged by the probable results of the
defendant's acts foreseeable by the normal man similarly situated.

.

.

.

This once being admitted or established, the liability

for injuries sustained is to be determined by the natural consequences,
those resulting from the operation of the ordinary natural laws,
animate and inanimate." 10 In other words, the extent of the defendant's liability should be as great as the natural consequences of
his negligence. When both the first injury and its increased effect
are, in fact and reason, the natural consequences of the defendant's
negligence, the law should regard them as such and impose an
adequate liability. There appears in logic to be no distinction whatever between these cases of aggravation by the plaintiff's own lawful act, and the cases, previously discussed, of aggravationby disease and mistake in medical treatment.
There are two explanations, however, for the doctrine of the
minority cases. In all of them there is an apparent fear of punishing the defendant by heavier damages than might ordinarily have
been expected to follow from his act. This, it is submitted, is regarding the damages as punitive, when they are in fact sought
as compensatory, and the exact measure of compensatory damages
should be coextensive with the natural consequences of the defendant's negligence. The second explanation-and this relates to the
Pennsylvania cases alone-is to be found in the rule in this jurisdiction that the question of proximate cause is for the court, where the
facts are not in dispute and the inference to be gathered therefrom
'Hartnett v. Tripp, supra in Note 6. While this case refers to the two
earlier cases as "clearly distinguishable," it fails to distinguish them and, it is
submitted, is, in fact, directly contra to Snow v. R. Co., supra in Note &
"Francis H. Bohlen in 49 Am. Law Reg. 79, 148, 161 (igor). "Where
such a rule of conduct established by public policy for the good of all is
violated, the wrongdoer should answer for all the consequences brought about
by the working out of the injurious tendency of his wrongful act until the
ordinary natural laws of cause and effect are diverted by some outside agency.
The question is not what should the defendant pay, but what should
the plantiff receive.. It may be hard to mulct the wrongdoer in damages for
results which the normal man would not anticipate, but it is more unjust that
the person injured by the breach of a duty imposed for his protection should
not recover for all the loss which has in ordinary course of nature been
caused to him by the wrong, because the wrongdoer could not foresee the full.
effect of his act." Id. at p. 79.
See, also, Sutherland. Damages (4th ed. i916). vol. 4, p. 4678: "The rule
of liability . . . rests on the principle that in actions for tort the party
who commits a trespass or other wrongful act is liable for all the injury proximately resulting, although such injury could not have been contemplated as
the probable result of the act done and may have been the indirect result
thereof."

NOTES

is "plain." 21 Since an inference is a conclusion of fact from other
facts,2 it is submitted that it is an encroachment upon the jury's
function for the court to decide the question of proximate cause,'1

where two or more inferences are conflicting and in dispute, as in
these cases.
If the analogy between the three kinds of cases which have
been discussed here is sound, and if these cases all fall within the
strict rule of tort liability, as is believed, it appears that there is no
distinction between the first injury and the aggravated injury, even

if promoted by the injured person's own act, and that recovery
should be allowed for all the natural consequences of the defendant's

negligence, as found by the jury.

P. IV.
TIHE RIGHT OF A PARTIALLY DISABLED EMPLOYEE TO RECOVER
FULL COtPENSATION FOR AN INJURY WHICIH

PACITATFS

COMPIETELY INCA-'

Ii.-When a man previously partially incapacitated by

the loss of an eye, an arm or a leg enters an employment in which he
is given the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and is
unfortunate enough to suffer a further injury which results in the
loss of the remaining eye or limb, an interesting question arises.
Granting that the injury is compensable under the statute and that
the employee is so incapacitated that he is unable to obtain employmcnt in the future, should he be allowed to recover compensation for
total permanent disability or should he be restricted by the definite
provision to be found in most 'Workmen's Compensation Acts to
the amount therein allowed for the loss of one eye, one arm or one

leg?
With two exceptions,' discussed hereafter, the solution of this
problem has been left to the judgment of the courts. The situation

was apparently not anticipated by the draftsmen of the various acts
and as a consequence a diversity of construction of almost identically
worded statutes has given rise to an evenly balanced split among the
states 2 whose tribunals have answered the question.

"Township of 'Vest

Pa. 574, 3 At. 866 (1886);
Pa. 629, 57 Atl. 7o (i9o4).

Mahanoy v.Watson, 112

Gudfelder v.Pittsburg, etc., Rwy. Co.,

2o7

"Smith v.Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Mo. App. 259 0894). See also Joske
v.Irvine, 9z Tex. 574, 44 S. W. 1o5 (898), where an inference was defined
as "a deduction which the reason of the jury makes from the facts proved."
"See discussion by Francis H. Bohlen, in 49 Am.Law Reg. 79,87 (igot).
'The problem is specifically covered by statute in New York and Minnesota.
'The case has been decided in the following jurisdictions: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana. Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and England.
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In a recent Pennsylvania case 3 the claimant, who had entered
the employer's service with only one eye, was rendered totally blind
by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Tlhe Supreme Court decided that the amount of compensation due
was limited to the amount recoverable for a single eye. The injury
and not the incapacity was held to be the controlling factor in determining the award. Since the statute in Pennsylvania provides specifically for compensation for -the loss of one eye,2 and since the
employee has lost only one eye, it would be contrary to the express
provisions of the act, stated the opinion, to allow the claimant to
recover for total blindness.
California, Indiana,? Michigan, Minnesota, New York"0 and
England 11 had previously come to the same conclusion under similar facts.
A recent case in Illinois 12 which -as on all fours with the
Pennsylvania case was decided exactly contra. An injury, said the
court, which caused the loss of the remaining eye necessarily caused
a total disability to see. It followed, therefore, that since the employee vas permanently incapacitated he should be allowed to recover
for total disability.
This view has been maintained by the following states: Colo'Lente v. Lucci,

119

Atl. 132 (Pa. 1922).

' The Court decided that the claimant must recover under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Sec. .3o6, par. (c) being Pa. St. i0-o, Sec. 21995, 193%
June 26, P. L 642, providing that for "all disability resulting from permanent
injuries" the compensation shall be "exclusively" as therein provided, and not
under paragraph (a), being Section 21993, as for "total disability."
Se. 3o6, par. (c). The word "exclusively" is not to be found in the
Acts of many other states, but this does not seem to assist very materially in
the solution of the problem, and where the word is not actually used, it may
be fairly implied.
"Rouner v. Columbia Steel Company, 2 Cal. 1. A. C. 233 (1915).
Stevens v. Marion Machine Foundry Co., T33 N. 1. 23 (Ind. 1921).
"Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co, x86 Mich. 588, 152 N. W. 993 (igis);
Collins v. Albrecht Co., 212 Mich. 147, 18o N. W. 480 (1920).
W9io (195).
'Garwin v. Dist. Court, 1--9 Mim. i56, i5t N. WV.
-State Indus. Comm. v. Newman, 222 N. Y. 363, ii8 X. E. 794 (z9x8).
K B. 172 (196) ; 114 L. T. (N. S.) 25.
The Court
Heaps v. Indus. Comm.. 3o3 Ill. 443, 135 N. F. 742 (92z).

31Hart v. Cory Bros.,

in this case thought that the claimant had sustained the loss of both eyes
within the meaning of the Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 48, SLc.
1-6-i52).

NOTES

rado," Connecticut," Iowa,15 Louisiana,"6 Massachusetts," and New
Jersey.' 6
All the cases cited supra have involved the loss of eyesight, but
the jurisdictions where the situation has arisen have consistently applied their reasoning to the analogous case 9of an employee, lacking
a limb, incapacitated by the loss of another."
In deciding questions of this character which involve the interpretation of an act, and which under that act might well go either
way, courts follow the usual rule of statutory construction by resting their final decision upon the intention of the legislature and the
purpose of the statute. They attempt to make the result of
20 the
decision consistent with this intention and sound public policy.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in an opinion upholding the
award of compensation for total permanent disability, finds behind
the Workmen's Compensation Act the principle that an- individual
21
injured by his employment is owed a living by that employment.
The partially disabled workman is rendered totally unfit for labor
solely because of his work. The idea seems to be that an incapacitated laborer, like a disabled war veteran, should be supported by
the backers of the project through which he was injured."
The Massachusetts courts, in allowing recovery for total disability, give as the reason for their decision the fact that a partially
disabled man can be employed only in a limited capacity, for which
he usually receives less remuneration than a workman of normal
capacity. His total disability is the result of the loss of his partial
capacity and since he was deprived 6f this he should recover full
compensation for it.'
"Indus. Comm. of Colo. v. State Insurance Compensation Fund, 203 Pac.
215 (Colo. 1922).

v. Hartford Rubber Works, 95 Conn. 350, 111 Atl. 193 (192o).
v. Mason City Sewer Pipe Co, 174 N. W. 785 (Iowa i919).
"Brooks v. Peerless Oil Co., 146 La. 383, 83 So. 663 (19"o) ; Guderian v.
Sterling Sugar & Ry. Co., 91 So. 546 (La. rgz).
"In re Branconnier, 223 Mass. 273, zii N. E. 792 (x916).
"Combination Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Essex
Co., iiS Atl. 138 (N. J. 1922).
"Wabash Ry. Co. v. Indus. Comm. 286 111. 194, 121 .N4. E. 569 (igig);
Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 418 (1922 ed.).
" In fact in all the decided cases the courts seem to lay more stress upon
the practical result of the solution than upon a construction of the words
of the statute. It seems that the split is the result of diversity of opinion
on an economic problem, rather than a mere difference of interpretation of
words.
mBrooks v. Peerless Oil Co., supra in Note 16.
"See Honold, Workmen's Compensation, VoL 1, Sec. 2 (x918 ed.) for
full discussion.
-'Inre Branconnier, supra in Note 17.
11 Fair

SJennings
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But, as the recent Pennsylvania case points out,2 ' the soundness
of the view of these courts is doubtful from an economic standpoint. Isn't the fundamental purpose of the Vorkmen's Compensation Act to benefit the laboring class as a whole, rather than any
particular unfortunate individual? 2' A workingman who is handicapped by the loss of a leg, or an arm, or an eve. must find employment to prevent himself and his dependents from becoming a
charge upon the community. It seems very unlikely that employers
would welcome applicants for positions to whose partial physical
disability was added the burden of a knowledge that a slight accident. wvhich because of the disability was made more probable, might
render the employer liable for the injured man's support as one totally incapacitated by the employment. Under the Massachusetts
view the un fortunate individual is compensated sympathetically and
generously. but it is impossible to ascertain how many needy cripples
have been deprived of the opportunity to earn an honest livelihood
because of the rule.
In Minnesota. the draftsman of the Workmen's Compensation
Act foresaw this difficulty and expressly provided that the liability
of the employer should be limited to the particular injury unrelated to any previous injury. 6
The history of this problem in New York is particularly interesting and the solution which has been worked out seems both just
and reasonable. An early case in that jurisdiction allowed a recovery for total permanent disability. - 7 Appreciating the hardship thus
cast upon crippled applicants for positions, the legislature passed an
amendment which made the employer liable for the actual injury
alone, but directed that the employee be paid further compensation
for life out of a special fund held in trust by the state treasurer.28
This fund is maintained by payment of the sums due employees,
killed under conditions making compensation payable, who leave no
dependents with claims as beneficiaries.
This amendment has been recently declared constitutional and
seems fair to all concerned. - It does not work a hardship upon
' Lente v. LuccL, .supra in Note 3.
' Boyd. Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 34 (1913 ed.); Honold, Workmen's Compensation. Vol. 1, Art. I (1918 ed.).
' Discussed in Garwin v. Dist. Court supra in Note 9. See Sec. Ts of Minnesota Compensation Act.
' The claimant had previoudy lost one hand and in the course of his
employment suffered an injury which resulted in the amputation of the other.
Ile was allowed to recover for the loss of both. Schwab v. Emporium F. Co.,
216 N. Y. 712 (191;). affirmed in 167 App. Div. 614 (1g16).
'N.
'. Workmen's Compensation Act, Sec. m.z,subd. 7, added by laws
of iq96 c. 622.
- State Indus. Comm. v. Newman, supra in Note To.

NOTES

crippled applicants for positions or upon individual employers. In
addition the disabled workman is saved from the almshouse.
From a practical standpoint this amendment is particularly desirable because, following the theory of the Workmen's Compensation Act,"° it indirectly casts the burden of payment upon the public
at large in adding slightly to the cost of production of every commodity. The additional few thousand dollars paid annually by the
insurance companies to the state treasurer means a trifling increase
in insurance rates. The employer adds his share of the increased
premiums to the debit side of the ledger and the manufactured article is sold for a few cents more to the ultimate consumer. The contribution, thus unknowingly made by the public, enables the permanently disabled workman to exist for the remainder of his life
as a charge upon the state, but free from a humiliating realization
of the fact.
A recent attempt to pass a similar amendment in Pennsylvania
failed. I Iowever. its supporters plan to try again in the near future,
and it is to be hoped that they meet with success. ' Unloubtedly
many jurisdictions will some day find this amendment a simple solution of a difficult problem.

-

.

t
WHAT CONSTITUTES A "BusINESS"

UXDFR TIE INCOME TAX

LAws.-The most familiar words in the English language are often
the most difficult to define accurately; such a word is "business."
It is used colloquially in a variety of senses to connote widely different activities." It "is not a technical term of the common law," 2
and standing alone seems to have no established legal meaning. It
has been defined in many different ways. The United States Supreme Court in one decision said it "is a comprehensive term and
embraces everything about which a person can be employed." 3 In
another it is defined "as that which occupies the time, attention and
'Kenny v. Union Ry. Co., j66 App.. Div. 497, 152 N Y. S. 117 (1915);
Spratt v. Sweeny & Gray Co., x68 App. Div. 403, j53 N. Y. S. 505 (1915).
Thus when one says, "I will make it my 'business' to find a certain

thing," he really means he will give it his particular attention. When one

says, "It is none of my 'business," he means that it is none of his "affairs."

When one says, "This 'business' is profitable." he refers to a particular enterprise.

But when le says "'Business' generally is highly commercialized," he

refers to business as an abstract term.
'In re Green's Estate, I;8 N. Y. S. 353. 359: o9 Misc. Rep 112 (19T9).
'Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. io7 (gio). and other cases concurrently decided involving a tax assessed on corporations for the privilege
of "doing business" in a corporate capacity under the Income Tax Act of
1oo. Sec. 38. Similarly defined in Parker Mills v. Commissioner of Taxes,
23 N. Y. 242 (t86i).
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labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit."4 The Uniform
Partnership Act states that "'business' includes every trade, occupation and profession," 5 and in the notes to the Act, William Draper
Lewis, its draftsman, defines "business" as "a series of acts directed toward an end." 8 This definition gives the term a very broad
meaning, and also includes those occupations that are not directed
toward profit as an end, but the Uniform Partnership Act specifically
limits the application of the Act to a "business for profit." A recent decision defines "business" as "the doing or performing of a
series of acts which occupy the time, attention and labor of men for
the purpose of livelihood, profit or pleasure." " It is to be noted that
two of these definitions require a series of acts: two state that these
acts must occupy the time, aticntion and labor of men; two define
the purpose as being livelihood or profit; whereas three give "business" a broader meaning and include pleasure as an alternative purpose. It is clear, therefore, that the use of the word "business" in
a statute must result in considerable uncertainty as to just how the
courts will construe it.5
Thus we find a wealth of decisions 9 by Federal and State Courts
on what constitutes "doing business" 20 by a foreign corporation so
as to make itself amenable to service of process and to restrictions
put upon corporations "doing business" within the jurisdiction. But
the courts have not agreed upon any definite tests to apply to determine what constitutes "doing business" in every case. Instead they
have contented themselves with deciding each case according to its
own facts, and have frequently held that facts which constitute "do"Von Bombach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 5o3, 515 (ixg6). The
same definition is given by Jessel, M. R., in Smith v. Anderson. i5Ch. Div.
247, 258 (Eng. 1879). But Brett, L. J., in the same case in the Court of
Appeals. defined "business" as "a series of acts having the acquisition of gain
for their object." is Ch. Div. 247, 278 (Eng. i88o).
'Part I, See. 2.
'Notes to the draft of the Uniform Partnership Act, 1922 ed., Sec. 6 (1),
P. 34.
, Fuller v. Allen, 46 Okla. 417, 423, 148 Pac. ioog (i9xS), which was decided under the foreign corporations act of that state.
' Smith v. Anderson, supra in Note 4; Parker Mills v. Commissioner of
Taxes, supra in Note 3; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra in Note 3.
'For a collection of recent decisions as to when a corporation is "doing
business" see Thompson, Corporations (2d ed.), sec. 6670, particularly
the 1922 Cumulative Supplement. secs. 667o-668t; "What Constitutes 'Doing
Business' by a Corporation in States Foreign to the State of its Creation"
(January 15, 1922), published by The Corporation Trust Company.
"In these cases the courts generally have not had to decide whether the
corporation was engaged in business since it was generally admitted that it
was so engaged in another jurisdiction. The question in issue was whether the
corporation performed sufficient acts of business within the state to make it
engaged in intrastate as well as interstate business, and subject to the corporation laws of that state.

NOTES
ing business" in cases involving service of process do not constitute
"doing business" so as to bring it within the regulating statute."
The Federal Income Tax Laws levy a tax on the incomes derived from all "businesses, trades and professions." '2 But none
of them defines *'business" comprehensively, although one provides
that "the terms 'trade" or 'business* include profesSions or occupations." ' Since this definition corresponds to the one in the Uniform
Partnership Act. but unlike it, is unlimited in its application, we
would be led to epcct an income tax on occupations that are not
directed toward profit as an end. But there appears to be no decision
which flatly decides that an enterprise conducted merely for pleasure
and not for profit constitutes a -business," although one of the above
definitions," which puts 'livelihood, profit or plkasure" as the purpose of "business," leads to the inference that it does. And Ii'ilson v.
Eisner,: 5 a recent decision of a Circuit Court of .\ppeals, held that
the mere fact that a person devoted his time to the undertaking
much as though it were an avocation did not change its status as a
"business" where the other characteristics were present and it was
directed toward profit as an end. Thus, although "business" is frequently given a broad meaning in definitions so as to include also
occupations not directed toward profit as an end, nevertheless, in
the practical application of statutes in which it is used," in order

" See 36 I Av. L R.v. 346 IJanuary 1923); 30 YALE I- REv. 3..1) (1921).
Also see i8 Mict. L REV. 346 19-o); 33 ImAev. Llt.Y. 616 (192,o).
" Income Tax Act of 1913. Sec. II, A, Subd. i ; Act of i9o9,Se-. 38 (excise tax on corporations carrying on. engaging in, or doing business): War
Excess Profits Tax Act of 1917, Sec. ,o.
' War Excess Profits Tax Act of 1917, Sec. .'oo
" Fuller v. Allen, supra in Note 7.
1'282 Fed. 38 (C. C. A. t922). In this case the plaintiff was a -sportsman" engaged in the raising and breeding of horses on a 5oo-acre farm in
charge of a force of men. tie devoted considerable time and attention in
watching his horses at horse shows and race tracks, and received an income
in the form of prizes awarded at fairs, purses at race tracks, and also from
sales of stock. But in the years in question (1913-14) the expenses by far
exceeded the income. In making his income tax return he deducted the expenses incurred in operating the farm and in transporting the horses from
place to place where they were exhibited or raced, claiming that these were
"business expenses," which were permitted to be deducted under the act. (Income Tax Act of t91.y Sec. II. B (5]j.
But they were disallowed by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on the ground that the taxpayer was not engaged in "business" inasmuch as this enterprise was conducted riot for profit.
but merely for the pleasure he derived from watching his horses race. The
court held that the taxpayer was engaged in a "bu.iness" for profit and was
therefore entitled to deduct all business expenses. It decided that the mere
fact that he was a "sportsman in that he was fond of racing his horses did
not change the character of his undertaking, since it was directed toward
profit.
For example, the Uniform Partnership Act, supra in Note s.
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that an enterprise may constitute a "business" it must at least have
profit as one of its objects, if not the primary one.t
The authorities are practically in accord that one of the necessarv characteristics of a 'business" is the performing of a series of
acts, and not merely a single isolated transaction without intention
"
The recent decisions under the Income Tax Laws
to repeat it.
uphold that view. Thus it was held that a single isolated activity
such as a lawyer's acting as an executor for a friend, when he never
acted as an executor before nor held hihmself out as one, did not
constitute a "'business" so as to make the commissions received there3
from taxable under the Excess Profits Tax. ' The court in that
case distinguishes between "what a person makes it his trade, pro.
vocation to do, or holds himself out prepared
fession or
"No matter how often repeated or continuous transactions may br, if
conducted by persons not in trade or commerce for purposes of investment of
capital and income, they do not constitute 'business' within the meaning of the
Tax Law." In re Gro-n's Estate, supra in Note 2, at p. 361.
"Fuller v. Allen, supra in Note ;; Cooper M fg. Co. v. Ferguson, :13
95
U. S. ;7- (is4): Comminwcalth -. Wilkes-larre. etc. R. Co., !51 Pa. 4%

Atl. 9'5 (:915); Sunrise Lumber Co. v.Biery Lumbe- Co., i93 App. Div. 17o,
l21); Empire Fuel Co. v. Lyons, 26 Fed. .5jo (D. C.
i11
183 N. V. S. ;
This series of acts must. furthermore, be directed to carrying on
£92!).
the affairs for which the business or corporation was organized, and not
merely acts for the purpose of maintaining its internal affairs or corporate
corporation leased its lines and rolling
existence. Thus, where a railroad
stock to anuther corporation arg :,ok no part in its operation or management,
merely maintaining its corporate existence. exercised its power of eminent
domain for the lessee at the expense and for the profit of the lessee, and received its rentals anti distributed dividends to stockholders, it was held not to
be -doing business" under the Corporate Excise Tax Act, Aug. 5.i9o9, c.6,
,Stec. 38. 36 Stat. i12 (Comp. St. 1913, Sec. 6300-6307), providing for an excise
tax on all corporations organized for profit and engaged in business. Llewell in v. Pittsburgh. B. & L E. R. Co., 2a let!. i;', j37 C. C. A. 617 (t915).
" Lederer v. Cadwalader, 73 ed. 87; (D. C. 1g92), affirmed in 274 Fed.
753 (C. C. A. 192:), arising under Sec. "09.of the Income Tax Act of 1917,
in which the court approves the interpretation given this section by the Secretary of the Treasury in Article 8 of Regulation 41, which states that "in
the case of an individual, the term. 'trade.' 'business' and 'trade or business'
comprehend all his activities for gain. profit or livelihood, entered into with
.ufficient frequency, or occupying such portion of his time or attention as to
constitute a vocation, including occupations and professions..... And all
income arising therefrom shall be included in his return for excess profits
tax;- excepting -(a) Gain or profits from transactions entered into for
profit, but which are isolated, incidental or so infrequent as not to constitute
an occupation; and (b) the income from property arising merely from ownership. including interest, rent. and similar income from investments except in
those casts in which the management of .uch investments really constitutes a
trade or business.' In accord with this decision is a ruling by the Solicitor
of Internal Revenue that the compensation received from a decedent's estate
1Wy a person for boarding, caring and nursing members of the decedent's
family. wans not derived from a business, vocation or trade, when it was not
the regular occupation of the recipient. Bulletin ;z of i92, ruling 1t9r..;
Committee on Appeals and Review Recommendations, ;o6.

XOTES

to do," and "'some particular isolated thing of the same nature . . . which he cccasionally happened to do." The mere
fact that others make a business of doing similar things makes no
real difference, unless engaged in with sufficient frequency, or occupying such time and attention as to constitute a vocation in itself.
lut the royalties received from a particular patent were ruled by
the Treasury Department to be subject to the Hxcess Profits Tax on
'businesses" and "trades." where the inventor had previously perfected other inventions and had spent several years on this one.-'
Likewise, when an officer of a corporation had secured an option
on its control, and exercised it several years later, earning a commission on the transaction, he was ruled to be in business and bubject to the Excess Profits Tax of 1917, Section 209, "as being made
possible through his business connections."'
Another element that courts have frequently considered in determining whether an undertaking was a business is the time and
attention devoted to it. But the dictun in a recent case " clearly
indicates that this element is not in itself important, for the doing
of a particular isolated thing may result in the person's devoting
l)ractically all his time to it without involving the thought of making
it is vocation. Thus. an amateur in a sport or other undertaking
may devote more time in developing and perfecting skill in it than the
avowed professional does. and still not make it his business. I lowever, it appears that the taxpayer must devote some time, attention
and labor to the enterprise. but how much is a question of fact to
be determined from the circumstances in each case.
The maintenance of a place of business is not in itself necessary
to constitute a "'business." for it is evident that one may carry on a
business 1 a series of acts that net him a profit without having an
office, store or factory. On the other hand. the mere maintenance
of an office and office force for private purposes is not by itself sufIt is interesting to note that a retired attorney who conducted only one
suit in court for a friend. without fee or reward, was held not to be engaged
in the profession of a practicing attorney so as to be liable to a fine for
failure to register. McCargo v. State, 64. Miss. 221. 1 So. 161 (t887).
' Bulletin 4! of 1921. ruling 1874; Committee on Appeals and Review
Recommendations. 42:5. Thus **a single transacton by a foreign corporation
may constitute a doing of business in a state where the transaction is part of
the ordinary business of such corporation and indicates a purpose thereafter
to carry on a substantial part of the dealings in the state." Thompson.
Corporations. t92, Cumulative Supplement to scond edition. Sec. 6674- See
Thomson v. lowva State Travelling Men's Asso.. 13 Neb. 399. I29 X. IV. z.j
(t9r'); Boddy v. Continental Inv. Co, 88 So. 294 (Ala. App. 19-n).
'Cumulative Bulletin No. 4 (ig2t), Committee on Appeals and Review
Recommendations. 350.
"Lederer v. Cadwalader. -3 Fed. 8;9. 881 (D. C. i92:). See Note :9.
jupra.
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ficient. But that fact, when supported by other circumstances, may
be conclusive evidence. 2 '
It is submitted, therefore, from a consideration of the above
definitions and decisions, that the essential characteristics of a "business" are as follows: (t) The doing or perfortming of a series of
acts directed to carying on the affairs for which the business was
organized. f,2) Although "business" is generally treated as a broad
and all-inclusive term, intluding in its terminology occupations that
are not directed toward profit as an end, in practical application,
particularly under the Income Tax Laws, profit must be the primary,
or at least an important objective of the undertaking. (3) The one
engaged in business must devote some time, attention and labor to
the enteqrise, but how much will depend on the circumstances of
each case. (4) Ile need not maintain a place of business, although
its maintenance coupled with other facts may be evidence in deciding whether his enterprise is a "'business."
S. H. S.
TYIxG CONTRACTS UNDER FFDER.AL Acs.-At common law and
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act it was not unlawful to make
tying contracts.' As late as 1911 the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld a contract in which a licensee of certain articles agreed
that he would purchase necessary accessories only from the licensor.2
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ' provides *'that
' There is an apparent split of authority on whether the maintenance of
an office within the jurisdiction by a foreign corporation is -doing business"
within the state. But the decisions are clearly distinguishable. The mere
maintenance of an office for convenience in the conduct of its internal affairs
or for purposes of promoting sales or soliciting orders, which are transmitted to the home office for acceptance and shipment has been held not to
constitute "doing business" within the state. System Co. v. Advertisers Cyclopedia Co, 121 N. Y. S. 6tn (Sup. Ct. i91): Larkin Co. v. Commonwealth,
172 Ky. io6, 189 S. W. 3 (1916); People v. Mascot Copper Co., 202 I1. App.
But it has been held to constitute "doing business" within the
151 (1916).
state when the contract also takes effect there by acceptance; or a stock of
goods is carried therein from which orders are to some extent filled; or
pa-ments are received there from customers, and deposited in a local bank. International Text Book Co. V. Pigg. 217 U. S. 91 (1O9); U. S. Fashion Co.
v. Schmidt 2o9 111. App. 24o (1917); Pittsburgh Electric Specialties Co. v.
Rosenbaum. 169 X. Y. S. 157; io2 Misc. Rep. 3-2o (1918) ; Fleischman Const.
Co. v. Blauner's, igo App. Div. 95, 179 N. Y. S. 193 (1919).
'In re Greene, 5- Fed. 104 (C. C. z892); \Vhitwell v. Continental Tobacco
Co. 125 Fed. 4_4, 6o C. C. A. 29o (i9o3); Ripy & Son v. Art Wall Paper
Mills. 41 Ok. 2,. 136 Pac. Qo- (1913). The various conditional requirements
which ill mak a "tying contract" are enumerated in Stevens, Unfair Competition, Ch. 4 (1917).
'Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., =4 U. S. i. See Note 5 infra.
'38 Stat. 717, 719 (Comp. St., sec. 836 e).

NOTES

unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared tinlawful." Section 3 of the Clayton Act " declares "that it shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce

make a sale or contract for the sale of goods

.

. .

.

to lease or

whether pat-

ented or unpatented . . . on the condition . . . that the
.
. of a
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods
competitor . . . where the effect of such sale, contract for

.
. may be to substantially lessen comsale, or such condition
petition or tend to create a monopoly." An analysis of these sections shows that before the courts can reach a conclusion as to the
legality of a tying contract they must determine (i) what are unfair methods of competition, and (2) what effects amount to a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency to create a monopoly.'
"'nfair competition" is not new to the law; I but the courts had
not been called upon to give a settled construction to "unfair methods
of competition" until the passage of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.7 The meaning of these words is a matter of statutory construction for the courts.' The term has been defined in the negative as
being "clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore characterized
by deception, bad faith, or against public policy because of their
dangerous tendency to hinder competition or create a monopoly." 1
This test has been consistently applied." To whom the methods
(Comp. St., sec. 8835 c).
'The Dick Case, supra, was overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v.

4'38 Stat. 730. 731

Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917), the latter decision being under

the patent law and not under the Clayton Act.
"The term seems first to be found in connection with efforts to protect
trade-marks anid was defined as the wrong of a trader who attempted to pass
off the goods of another as his own. Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66 (Eng.
1842); Reddaway v. Banham, A. C. igg (Eng. i896); Rathbone, Sard & Co.
v. Champion Steel Range Co., 189 Fed. a-6, 11O C. C. A. 5s6 (191i). Recently
unfair competition has been extended in its legal import to include "any conduct onk the part of one trader which tends unnecessarily to injure another
in his business." Rogers. "Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade," 27
11AtRV. L REX'. 139. See, also, Haines, "Efforts to Define Unfair Competition,"
29 YALE L. J. x (igig).
'Congress deliberately avoided a definition. Report of Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, June 13, 1914, 63d Congress, 2d session, No. 597, p.
13. Challenges to the validity of this section because of its indefiniteness were
denied in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 2.8 Fed. 307,
i69 C. C. A. 323 (1919); National Haniess .Mfrs. Assn. v. Federal Trade
Commission et at., :8 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. :92o); T. C. Hurst & Son v. Federal Trade Commission et al., 258 Fed. 874 (C. C. A. ig2o).
'Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz el aL, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920);
Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., U. S. Adv. Ops. 231
(1922-23).

' Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz et aL, supra in Xote 8, at p. 427.
"Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 42 Sup. Ct. Rep.
15o (1922), and a number of the other Supreme Court decisions under the
Act apply that test.
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must be unfair to make them unlawful is a mooted question. The
appeal in Federal Trade Commission z,. Gratz 11 was dismissed because the complainant failed to allege that either the public or a
competitor had suffered.': In another case ' the court seems to infer
that if a contract is unfair to the public, it is illegal, regardless of
whether it is unfair to a competitor. 4 The Court in the Federal
Trade Commission v. I'insted Hosiery Co.' said: "As a substantial
part of the public was misled . . . the public had an interest
in stopping tie practice as wrongful, and since the business of the
trade rivals . . . was necessarily affected by that practice, the
commission was justified in its conclusion that the practice constituted an unfair method of competition." It would appear safe to'
say that a tying contract would not be unfair under the Federal
Trade Commission Act unless it was at least unfair to tle public
and showed a dangerous tendency also to hinder competition or
create a monopoly."I
The Supreme Court has said that the Clayton Act was meant
to determine the legality of tying contracts by specific tests of its
own." It also seeks to reach the agreements embraced within its
sphere in their incipiency.'" The conclusion, therefore, may be
drawn that the test under the Clayton Act is other than that laid
down at common law or under the Sherman Act."' Because there
" Supra in Note &
"Justices Brandeis and Clark dissented upon the ground, among others,
that the case should not have been disposed ot upon pleading.

"Federal. Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., supra in Note io.
"The majority of the court seems to reject the view that the conduct
had to be unfair to a competitor.
'U. S. Adv. Ops. 442, 444 (1922-23).
"A tying contract per se is not unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act. This is well shown by Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz es
al., supra in Note 8; Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., supra
in Note 1o; Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., Jupra in
Note &
' Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., U. S. Adv. Ops. 397
(i921-22). The Fashion Co., a wholesaler controlling approximately two-fifths
of the pattern business in the United States, contracted with retailers that they
should not sell any pattern but that of the wholesaler. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that the contract was unlawful under the Federal Trade
Commission Act and Clayton Act.
"United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, U. S. Adv. Ops. 420 (192122). The Shoe Machinery Corporation, which manufactured ninety per cent. of
the shoe machinery in the United States, stipulated in its leases that the lessee
should use with the machines only certain articles which were to be purchased
from the Shoe Machinery Corporation. The Supreme Court held that the
contract was unlawful. See also Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co., supra in Note 17.
" Some of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have displayed a tendency to
use the standards of legality as established by the Sherman Act in the words

NOTES
are few decisions of the Supreme Court under the Clayton Act 2' it
is difficult to determine just what these new tests are. It is plain
that the Act "deals with consequences to follow the making of the
restrictive covenant limiting the right of the purchaser to deal in
the goods of the seller only.'" : It is also plain that the courts will
not apply the Act to every remote lessening of competition."" The
Supreme Court seems to have been greatly influenced by the magnitutde aiul existing m.nopulstic power of the corporation. Its attitude may indicate a tendency to hearken back to one of the older
tests under the Sherman Act."3 Nor does a resort to the opinions

of the Circuit Courts of Appeals throw light on this problem. This
is definitely shown by two recent decisions.
In the Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Conminision 2 the
Standard Oil Company petitioned for a review of the Commission's
orders commanding it to stop the practice of leasing gasoline
pumps upon agreements that the lessee should use in them only the
lessor's gasoline. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the practice was not unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act
and Clayton Act. and directed that the orders of the Commission
should be set aside. ' '- The court, in determining what constituted
"unfair methods of competition" and a substantial lessening
of competition and a tendency to create a monopoly, used the standard of

legality established in the Sherman Act in the words "restraint of

"restraint of trade or enmmerce" and "monopolize or attempt to monopolize."
The early cases under the Sherman Act decided that every restraint of trade
whether reasonable or not was forbidden. United States v. r- C. Knight Co.,
t;6 U. S. i (1894) ; Williston, Contracts, sec. j658 (i92o). Other courts held
that there must be control over the entire commodity to constitute restraint
of trade. United States v. Nelson. s2 Fed. 646 (D. C. t&)2); Dueber Watch.
Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch & Clock Co.. 66 Fed. 637, 14 C. C. A. 14
(1895). The "rule of reason" was made the final test. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 8; Fed. 271. 29 C. C. A. 141 (188) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Co., "21 U. S. io6 (i9io); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U. S. 1 (1910). See 71 U. OF PA. L RFv. 48 (1922-23).
This is not true solely because the statute is of recent date, but also because the Federal Trade Commission's orders have usually been complied with
without review by a Circuit Court of Appeals. The Annual Report of June
30. 1921, p. 8. shows that only thirty-two appeals were taken in that year.
n'Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., supra in Note 17i, at
p. 400.

" Standard Fashion Co. v. ,Magrane-Houston Co., supra in Note 17, and
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, supra in Note 8.
Note 19, supra.
"482Fed. 81 (C. C. A. T922).

'See

-

'The competition was held not to be unfair: (t) to the public because
they were not injured; (2) to the wholesalers of gasoline because they were
not prevented from leasing pumps to the same retailers; (3) to the retailers
because they could demand removal of the pumps under the lease or could
install new ones without removing the old ones; (4) to the manufacturers of
the pumps because they were not interested after the sale to the wholesalers.
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trade or commerce" and "monopolize or attempt to monopolize." 2\\ hile it admitted that under the Clayton Act the tying contract was
to be construed by its effect as well as its terms, it decided that the
practical effect of the clause was not to lessen competition or create
a monopoly.27 The dissenting judge said that the practical effect
was to monopolize the numerous "one-pump dealers." It would
seem that the majority of the court is correct since each retailer had
a perfect right to deal with any wholesaler, and any monopoly which
apparently existed was not caused by the tying contract but by the
retailer's satisfaction with the wholesaler and his products.
In the Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Com"

pany ' the Circuit Court oi Appeals set aside an order of the
Commission commanding the Curtis Company to cease the practice
of contracting with its so-called "agents" that they would not sell
or act as agents for any other publishing house. The court decided
that the practice did not constitute an unfair method of competition
under the Federal Trade Commission Act; .9and that the Clayton
Act did not apply "Ubecause the contract was one of agency and
not of sale.31
In reaching the conclusion that the practice was not an unfair
method of competition, the court reviewed the entire testimony taken
by the Commission and made new findings of fact. Upon appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment of the lower
court was affirmed,:" Chief Justice Taft and Justice Brandeis dis-

senting. Both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton
Act provide that the findings of the Commission shall be conclusive
' See Note

19.

The test is obviously not that laid down by the Supreme

Court.
" The court used the same test under the Clayton Act as under the Federal Trade Commission Act, i. e.,that of the Sherman Act.
-'.7oFed. 881 (C. C. A. i921).
' The court said the practice was not unfair to the public because they
had freedom of access to other vendors of magazines; nor to other wholesalers because the Curtis system, being unique, resulted in the utilization of
the services of boys who had not been previously suitable for employment.
The only unfairness which the court could see was to the Curtis Company
in having other companies using the system which it had so tediously built
up.
wThe Clayton Act is limited to sales or contracts for the sale of goods
and does not apply to contracts of agency. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., supra in Note 5.
' The contract was held to be one of agency and not of sa!e because of
ia) its language; (b) the fact that title remained in the Curtis Co. until the
..- ;nes were sold; (c) the fact that the whole purpose of the Curtis Co.
was simply to distribute to the public through this agency.
, Supra in Note &

NOTES

If there be substantial evidence reif supported by the evidence.
lating to facts from which different conclusions might be drawn, the
matter ordinarily would be remanded to the Commission with direction to make additional findings.34 But the Supreme Court said
'tiat if it clearly appears that in the interest of justice the controversv should be decided without further delay, the court has full
power under the statute so to do" i. e., to make additional findings.
C. B. IV.
TuE CONTROL OF LEGISLATURES OVER INUNUCIPAL PROPERTY.-

The incorporation of municipalities came in England as a concession
to their demands for local self-government, the Crown finding it
and
worth while to conciliate communities which were so -vealthy
powerful as to be useful friends or dangerous enemies.1 When it
was found that the entities functioned so smoothly as agents of the
Sovereign. the inhabitants of the communities pressed the Sovereign
to allow the corporations to take and keep larger powers. Subsequently, the municipal corporation became more than a substitute
for the borough officials of the Crown-for, in addition to taking
upon itself the duties of the latter, it assumed the task of providing
for the necessities, comfort, convenience and protection of an urban
population, for which the Sovereign. acting through borough officials, had formerly had no concern whatever.2
In America, the development was along slightly different lines.
The people were originally sovereign, before they conferred supreme
political powers on the state legislatures. Among these powers was
the right to re-delegate different degrees of governmental capacity on
any municipalities which they should see fit to charter, as well as
'Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Sec. i of the Clayton
Act provide that the Circuit Court of Appeals "shall have jurisdiction of the
proceedings and of the questions determined therein, and shall have the power
to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth
in such transcript a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of
the commission. The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by the testimony, shall be conclusive."

'The Supreme Court has consistently held this to be the proper practice in cases arising under the act to regulate commerce. Louisville & Nashv-l!e Ry. Co. v. Behlmer, 157 U. S. 648 (igoo); Interstate Commerce Commission v.Clyde Steamship Co., i81 U. S. 29 (i9ox). See also the Curtis Case,
supra in 'Note 8, as to the practice under the acts herein discussed.
'Dillon, 'Municipal Corporations (4th ed. z89o), Sec. &
'Opinion of Justice Cooley in Park Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 Mich.
228 (1873).
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any other powers which the particular communities should desire
their corporate bodies to have, for the meeting of their own peculiar
needs. In both countries it appears that municipalities had two distinct sets of powers--one, granted by the Sovereign, Crown or State,
as the case might be, enabling the community to select the agents by
which the Sovereign governed it; the other empowering the corporation to fit human needs completely divorced from any ideas of
government. The first set of powers is called public; the second,
private or proprietary.
The difference between the city, as public agent, and the city
as proprietor, is an important one. When it is acting as the agent
of the legislature, the city can not be liable for actions in tort, because a citizen can not sue either the sovereign or his agent, though
it may be liable when acting in its private capacity. If the legislature attempts to infringe upon the proprietary rights of the city, the
city will be protected, as will be seen later, by the clause of the
Constitution of the United States forbidding the taking of private
property without just compensation
Though practically all courts will admit that there is a difference
between the public and proprietary capacity of the city, the exact
line which divides the two is extremely hard to draw. It has been
suggested that there is no logical distinction-that in their origin and
nature all powers, whether public or private, are similar; that, as
they all come from the legislature, which itself might have exercised
them under its general power to legislate for the regulation and
welfare of all the people in the State, they are no different from the
governmental function of keeping the peace, which the municipality
performs as an agent.4 The answer to this is that, from the nature
of the disbursion of population of the state into large and small
communities, or into no communities at all, the legislature could not
have legislated universally for all the objects of convenience and
comfort which people of particular communities find fitting for
their peculiar circumstances (the purposes for which private powers
are granted), except under a system of very advanced and efficient
paternalism. Although it is true that no universal rules can be
stated as to which powers and agencies of a municipality are public
and which are private, owing to the diverse nature of state constitutions, it can safely be said that the management by a municipality
of its public buildings, wharves, landing places,' police department,
'Fifth Amendment.

There are similar restrictions in the constitutions of

most of the states.
'Dillon, supra in Note i, Sec. 67.
' Meriwether v. Garrett, 1oz U. S. 501 (188o).

NOTES

jails," highways 7 schools," sewers,' hospitals and health department,"0
is generally held to be in its public capacity. Authorities are equally
(livided as to fire departments '1 and public parks.12 Most authorities are agreed that the city acts as proprietor with respect to water
works, lighting systems, gas works, 3 playgrounds, cemeteries, 4 public markets, and the like.
It is generally held that in the absence of expressed restrictions
in state constitutions, the power of the legislature to alter or recall
municipal charters at will is absolute so far as the municipality is
concerned.13 As the granting of a charter is fundamentally only a
provision for government, it is mere legislation, not a contract, and
hence is subject to revision and repeal. 10 Any power can be recalled
or the limits of the territory formerly subject to the jurisdiction of
the corporation may be changed. 17 However, no recall or revision
can affect the right of creditors of the corporation." Many authori'Elliot v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (874); Moody v. State's Prison, 128
12, 38 S. E. 131 (igoi); Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. 89
(1919).
'St. Paul v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 63 Minn. 330, 68 N. W. 458 (1895);
Zanesville v. Telephone Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 N. E. 781 (i9o0).
"Ford v. School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 0888); State v.
Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946 (i889): Leeper v. State, io3 Tenn. 5oo,
53 S. W. 96z (1899); Rosenblit v. Philadelphia, 28 Pa. Super 587 (1965).
'Kingman, Petitioner, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. E. 778 (1891); Martin v.
Tyler, 4 N. D. 278, 6o N. W. 392 (x89).
" Davorck v. Moore, ioS Mich. i2o, 63 N. W. 424 (1895).
"That they are private: Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 2
N. E. 267
('888); Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540; 68 S. W. 477 (1902); Davison
v. Hine. 151 Mich. 294; 115 N. IV. 246 (i9o8). That they are public: Fisher
v. Boson, 1o4 Mass. 87 (1870).
"That they are public: Daughters v. Riley County, 8i Kan. 5, io6 Pac.
2-97 (1910); Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 83, 99 N. E. 523 091m). That
they arc private: Park Commissioners v. Detroit, supra in Note 2; State v.
Edwards, 4z Mont. 135, MUPac. 734 (1go).
Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 183 (1858); Omaha
Vater Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. T,77 C. C. A. 276 (igo6).
"Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 513; 33 N1. E. 695 (1893).
21Frederick v. Greshon, 30 Md. 436, 444 (1869) ; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith. 100 U. S. 514, 524 (1879). Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.
1903) 342; Dillon, supra in Note r, Sec. 63.
"East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 1o How. stx, s34 (U. S. 785o);
Meriwether v. Garrett, supra in Note 5, at p. 5i ; Dillon, supra in Note x,
See. 54.
"East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., supra in Note 16, at p. 536;
Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; 67 Am. St. Rep. 748 (t856) ; Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 94 (186o): Cicero v. Chicago, 182 Ill. 301, 309,
55 N. E. 351 (899); Cooley, -Constitutional Limitations, 344; Dillon, supra
in Note i,Sec. 65.
"Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, supra in Note 13; Von
Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U. S. 1866); Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.
S. 266 08/6).
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ties hold, on the contrary, that the right to self-government is
an inherent one; that as the people, before they established the state
governments, had enljoyed the privileges of choosing their immediate governmental officials and of using municipal bodies as a means
of community action, they never intended that the legislature should
be able to curtail or recall local self-government, which they reserved to themselves by implication when they established the constitutions. 0 Itence, in these jurisdictions, in the absence of expressed
provisions enabling the legislatures to do so, the courts will prevent them from taking away either local self-government or the
private powers of a municipality. But if, as is universally admitted,
the legislature has power to grant charters, why can it not take them
away again? For this reason the "inherent right of local self-government" has been generally denied by the courts.2' However, there
appears to be no logical objection to this doctrine when applied to
the municipality in its proprietary capacity.21 There is no reason
wlv individuals should not have the power to act together for their
common welfare and hold property as members of a community.
In those jurisdictions where it is held that any power of municipality, or any power save that of choosing the local officials, may
be recalled, it is often a difficult problem to decide the effect of the
revocation on property of the municipal corporation which has been
held under a power which has been abolished, or which is situated
in territory put outside the corporation limits, or which the legislature has attempted in one way or another to take from the control
of the city and put to other purposes. A similar question arises
where the legislature seeks to change, or take the benefits of, contracts entered into by the municipality.
There seems to be little doubt but that the legislature has absolute control over all property held by the municipality in its governmental capacity.2 2 Any such property may be taken by the state
and put to some other public purpose."3 but may not be given to a
private individual or corporation.2 4 However, there is no right in
"Park Commissioners v. Detroit, supra in Note 2; State v. Denny, 118
Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252 (188) ; Evansville v. Blend, i8 Ind. 46 21 N. E. 267
1&S); Cooley, Municipal Corporations (1914 ed.), Sec. 23.
" State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 Atl. 24 (1896) ; Redell v. Moores, 63
Xeb. 219; 88 N. AV. 243 (19o); Adams v. Kuykendall. 83 Miss. 57T, 592; 35
South. 83o (19o3); Ancrum v. Light Co., 82 S. Car. 2,84, 294; 64 S. E. 151
(1908).
"New Orleans, etc.. R. R. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 478 0874) ; White
v. Barker, i16 Iowa 96; 89 N. W. 2o4 (102).
2Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, supra in Note 14; Meriwether v. Garrett, supra in Note s; Dillon, supra in Note 1, Sec. 71; Cooley, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 28.
'Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 3-6 (1859); Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S.
io8 (1876): Higginson v. Boston, supra in Note 12.
24 Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, supra in Note 14; Milam County v.
Bateman, 54 Tex. 153, i66 (i88o) ; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 345.
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the legislature to seize and control property held by a municipality
as proprietor.2" It is the property of the members of the community. Because the title is in the municipal corporation instead of
in the members of the community, as tenants in common, the property is none the less private; it is in no sense the property of the
organs of government. For this reason, the many authorities which
hold that such property can not be appropriated by the legislature

seem supported hy unescapable logic. Whether or not it be true
that the legislature can deprive a municipal corporation of the right
of existence or the right to exercise any particular power, if the

corporation has acquired property as trustee of the private individuals who make up the community, no reason can be found why this

should be subject to the power of the representltives of other private
individuals who live in other parts of the same state."' If the char-

ter of a strictly private corporation is withdrawn, the mere termination of its right to exist does not give the legislature any right to
the property acquired by the now defunct corporation.27 By analogy,
there would seem to be no more reason for allowing the legislature
to appropriate to its own uses property belonging to private individuals, who have been merely deprived of the right of using the
municipal corporation as an agent in the management of such property for their benefit. The right of a municipality to the benefits accruing under a contract has also been protected.'
*'Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 275; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston.
supra in Note 74; Webb v. The Mayor, 64 How. Pr. 10, 17 (N. Y. 1882);
Storey. J.. in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 692 (U. S. 1819):
"'But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect to corporations, the legislative power is so transcendent that it may at its will take away the private
property of the corporation or change the uses of its private funds, acquired
under public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the private
funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter, without any
default or consent of the corporators? If the municipal corporation is capable
of holding devises and legacies to charitable uses, as many corporations are,
does the legislature under our forms of limited government, possess the
authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other uses at its
own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors and the donees. From
the very nature of our government the public faith is pledged the other way,
and that pledge constitutes a valid compact; and that compact is subject onfy
to judicial inquiry, construction, and abrogation."
Such property is subject to execution on judgments had against the city,
unlike property belonging to the city as agent of the legislature. Darlington
v. The Mayor, 31 N. Y. 64. i94 (1865); Lyons v. Elizabeth, 43 N. J. L. 153
(1881).
,Park Commissioners v. Detroit, supra in Note 2.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S.7oo, 741 (1878) ; Greenwood v. Freight Co.,
105 U. S. 13, 19 (1887); Broadway Surface Case (People v. O'Brien), nt
N. Y. x, 5!, 97 N. Y. S. 514 (1888).
- State v. B. & 0. R. R.. 3 How. 548 (U. S. 1845) ; Richland Co. v. LawI (i85o) : Montpelier v. Montpelier, supra in Note ,7.
rence Co., 12 Ill.
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Because the law seems to be as hereinbefore set forth, the drctun-

oi the Supreme Court in the case of the City of Boston v. Jackson 21

seems unwarranted. The city of Boston had built and leased an
elevated railroad under authority granted by an act of the legislature. Subsequently, the legislature had seen fit to put the management of the railroad into the hands of a receiver, appointed by
itself, although the proceeds under the lease were to continue to
go to the city. The city brought a bill in equity to restrain the receiver from interfering with the management of the railroad, which,
it claimed, was held in its proprietary right. On appeal, the Supreme
Court dismissed the bill, holding that the right to own a railroad
was in the city's public capacity, and that whatever rights the city
of Boston had had not been infringed upon. The Court, however,
added these words: "In this conclusion, we assume as did the
Supreme Judicial Court, that the State may confer on one of its
subdivisions like a city or town the private proprietary capacity by
which it may acquire contract or property rights protected by the
Federal Constitution against subsequent impairment by its creator
the State. We do not wish to be understood as accepting such asstimption as an established rule." In support of this dictum, the
Court cited the case of the Pawhuska Oil Company v. Pawhuska3 0

where these words are found: "But further citations of authorities
on this point are unnecessary; they are full and conclusive to the
point that the municipality, being a mere agent of the state, stands
in its governmental or public character in no contract relation with
its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended,
changed, or revoked, while with respct to its private or proprietary

rights and interests, it may be entitled to the constitutional protection." Consultation with the foregoing authorities has afforded no
precedent or logical ground on which the court could have based its
dictum in the principal case.
W. C. F., Jr.
TiiE STATUS IN OUR COURTS OF THE LAWS OF AN UNRECOG2,Z-D SOVEREIGN GOVERNENT.-Since the condition at present of

the international family of nations is somewhat precarious and governments within states are often of short duration, several cases
have arisen during the last few years which have called for the
application of a well settled principle of international law. ,Vhen
the court of the forum is called upon to apply the law of another
state, there seems to be no split of authority as to what it must determine to be the law of that other state when its government has not
'United States Supreme Court N'o. 141, October Term, i922. U. S. Adv.
Ops. 144.
'250 U. S. 394 (xg8).
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been recognized by the government of the forum but the de facto and
unrecognized government has done acts which are internally sovereign. But the cases have demanded the attention of our courts,
and an interesting problem in international lav has been presented.'
What, for instance, is the status of the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic in our courts? 2
The question arose in Sokoloff v. The National City Bank of
New York.' The plaintiff deposited money with the defendant,
which agreed to open an account for him in its branch bank at Petrograd, Russia. Judge Lehman, of the New York Supreme Court,
refused to allow the defendant to show in its defense that the Bolsheviki party had seized all banks and had decreed that they should
be merged into the state bank. He said: "The impossibility of performance cannot avail the defendant unless such impossibility was
created by act of the sovereign, that is, by law." This impossibility
not having been created by a recognized sovereign was, therefore,
created by force and not by law. Apparently the same case was
before Judge Ford of the Supreme Court, but according to his opinion the motion to strike out this defense as insufficient in law was
denied.'
For the acts of an internally sovereign government to be respected by the courts of another state, that government must be recognized by such other state. Until such recognition occurs, a government does not have external sovereignty." Broad definitions of
law, such as, a rule for action or human conduct, prescribed by the
supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting
what is wrong, are definitions of law of the internal sovereign.
'There is no problem of international comity since that does not arise
until a government of a state has been recognized. Hershey, Essentials of
International Public Law, 3 (1912 ed.).
'The Soviet government has not been recognized by our government, although it is a matter of common knowledge that that government is de facto
the existing government of Russia. Wulfsohn et al. v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, =2 App. Div. 421, x95 N. Y. S. 472 (1922).
a II9 Misc. Rep. 332'(N. Y. Sept. 1922).
'This opinion was handed down on Dec. i9, 1922. No reference was
made to Judge Lehman's opinion, and Judge Ford was not exercising
appellate jurisdiction. The former case is, therefore, as authoritative as
the latter. Judge Ford's opinion contains an elaborate discussion of the doc-

trine of frustration of contracts, and his conclusion was reached under that
doctrine.
! ,Vulfsohn et al. v. Russian etc., supra in Note z; Hershey, Essentials of
International Public Law, c. VII; I Oppenheim. International Law, 121 (2d ed.
1912). Both Hershey and Oppenheim have collected citations to a large number of authorities.
'II Moore, Internaiional Law Digest, c. VI (i9o6 ed.); T Oppenheim,
International Law, ii; Hershey. Essentials of International Public Law, ioo;
Evans, Cases on International Law, 59 (1917). Blackstone's definitions of
law refer to municipal law. I B1. 38, 39, 44. This Note, obviously, is confined
to external sovereignty.
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The principle of international law is that, when a government
has been recognized by another state, its laws will be recognized
when such recognizing state is called upon to apply them.' "Who
is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial
but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds
the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that
government. This principle has always been upheld by this court
and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances."
In
ascertaining the facts which determine recognition, of which the
courts are bound to take judicial notice, the judges may inquire of
the Department of State.0 And until the political department recognizes a state or a government the courts are bound to consider the
old order of things as continuing. ,0
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the application of these principles in the cases of Octjen v. Central Leather
Co." and Ricand v,. American Metal Co."" In the former case, General Villa, in 1914, acting under Carranza, seized goods as a military
contribution and sold them to a party through whom the defendant
'See Note 5, supra. Recognizing a government and recognizing a state
should not be confused. A state may be recognized as a member of the family of nations, such as Russia. while its government de facto is not recognized.
I Oppenheim, International Law, i2o.
'Justice Gray in Jones v. United States. 137 U. S. 202, 212 (7890). "In
every case as it appears, of a new government and of belligerency, the question of recognition was determined solely by the executive." I Moore, International Law Digest, 243. There are many authorities supporting this proposition. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheaton 61o (U. S. 188); Williams v.
Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Peters 415 (U. S. 1839) ; Underhill v. Hernandez,
i68 U. S. 250 (1897) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (ioi8);
Ricaud, et al. v. American Leather Co., 246 U. S. 3o4 (x918); State of Yucatan v. Argumedo, et al. 92 Misc. Rep. 547, 157 N. Y. S. 219 (1915); Republic of Peru v. Drayfus Bros. & Co., L. R. .38 Ch. Div. 348 (England i888);
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co.. L R. (19"2), i K.
B. 456 (Eng.). reversed because of intervening facts, 3 id. 53z. The corollary
of this principle is that the modes of recognition also concern our political and
diplomatic departments. I Moore, International Law Digest, Ti9. The question of who represents a foreign government is a political problem. In re
Baiz. 135 U. S. 403 (1890). Under our Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. IV, the
ouestion as to which government is the rightful government of a state is not
given to the judicial department to solve. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. i (U.

S. 1849).
'Jones v. United States, supra in Note 8; Underhill v. Hernandez, supra
in Note 8.
"Kennett. et al., v. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (U. S. 1852); Republic of
Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co.. s,,pra in Note 8. This is treated as "a well established doctrine" in the latter case and a number of cases are cited to substantiate it, p. 359.
n upra in Note 8. affirming 87 N. J. L. 552 (i95).
"Supra in Note 8. A summary of this case appears among "Recent
Cases" in 3T HARV. L. REv. 1167 (1918).
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claimed title. The plaintiff brought an action of replevin, alleging
that title did not pass when Villa levied the goods. In 1915 the
Government of the United States recognized the government of
Carranza as the do facto government of Mexico and in 1917 as the
do jure government. Besides laying down the propositions already
recited, the court held that the recognition was retroactive in effect
and validated all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.1 3 In England
the same question was presented in Aksioiairnoye Obschestvo A. M.
Luthcr v. Sagor & Co.14 In 1919 the Soviet government took possession of a quantity of veneer belonging to the plaintiffs. The defendant's title resulted from the seizure and sale by the Soviet government. The court allowed the plaintiffs to recover because England had not recognized the Soviet government and, therefore, the
court could not say that such government was able to deprive the
plaintiffs of their property. While the case was being appealed, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recognized the Soviet government as the de facto government of Russia. The judgment was
accordingly reversed. The court cited three American cases in support of its decision."
The fact of recognition is important not only in . determining
what law of another state is to be applied, but also in ascertaining the
capacity of a foreign government to sue and be sued in our courts.
The test of the right of a foreign sovereign to sue in our courts
is its recognition by our government.' 0 So it has been held that
the Soviet government may not sue in our courts although it may be
sued. In this respect it is like a foreign corporation, but it does
not rise to the dignity and immunity of a foreign sovereign.'"
"*This was not a new princiilie announced in the case. The court cited

Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176 (1877), and Underhill v. Hermandez, supra
in Note 8, as also evidencing the rule.
4 Supra in Note &

I Williams v. Bruffey, supra in Note 13; Underhill v. Hermandez, supra
in Note 8; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra in Note 8. The English court
observed that in these cases no distinction was attempted to be drawn in argument between the effect of a recognition of a de facto government and the
recognition of a government de jure; and that, in Wililams v. Bruffy and
Underhill v. Hernandez, no authority is supported for the proposition of recognition being retroactive in its effect. This principle, however, was not
first recognized in those cases. See, for instance, Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39
Barb. 140 (N. Y. 1863).
"Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrarlo, ig App. Div.
869, 871 (N. Y. ig2).
State of Yucatan v. Argu', Wulfsohn v. Russian. etc., supra in Note 2.
medo, supra in Note 8; The Republic of Mexico v. Francis de Arangoiz, 5
Dyer 634 (N. Y. 1856); The Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 3io
(x889). The immunity of a foreign government from suit is based on international comity. Wulfsohn v. Russian, etc., n 8 Misc. Rep. 28, 192 N. Y. S.
282 (1922). See, also, Note i, supra.
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Should the United States recognize the present Russian government, probably many cases similar to the Oetjen Case would arise.
Such a recognition would, in its international aspect, have far-reaching effects of a not altogether desirable nature; so it would appear,
for this reason, that our Department of State has wisely refused
to recognize it.

A. M.$.

